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1  Introduction
In one of the most recent cases dealing with encroachment in South Africa, 
the Eastern Cape High Court had to decide whether it had the discretion to 
refuse an interdict for the removal of an encroaching fence.1 In Phillips v 
South African National Parks Board2 (“Phillips”) a predator-proof fence was 
erected on the property of the applicant, instead of on the cadastral boundary 
between the property of the applicant and that of the respondent. The fence 
had been erected on the applicant’s property before he had purchased the 
property and it resulted in a substantial portion of the property (the SANParks 
portion) being incorporated as part of the respondent’s land. The applicant 
sought an interdict to compel the respondent to remove the fence and relocate 
it to the cadastral boundary or onto the respondent’s property.
Three defences were raised against the application. In the first instance, the 
respondent contended that it had purchased the SANParks portion from the 
applicant’s predecessor in title (Van Rooyen) and had subsequently acquired 
ownership of the SANParks portion. Furthermore, the respondent argued 
that the applicant had purchased the property knowing that there had been 
an agreement between the respondent and Van Rooyen for the sale of the 
SANParks portion and was therefore not a bona fide purchaser. The second 
defence was that the applicant had been aware of the agreement between Van 
Rooyen and the respondent about the placement of the fence, specifically that 
the applicant knew that Van Rooyen had consented to the encroachment. For 
that reason it was argued that the fence did not result in an encroachment but 
was lawfully erected. Thirdly, the respondent argued that even if the fence 
resulted in an encroachment, fairness dictated that the encroachment should 
remain in place. In the counter-application, the respondent claimed that if 
the court were to find against him on the three defences it should grant a 
* I would like to thank André van der Walt for reading several drafts of this note and for valuable feedback  
I would also like to thank the students of the South African Research Chair in Property Law and the 
various participants at the Chair’s weekly seminars  Remaining errors are my own  
1 Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII 
<http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZAECGHC/2010/27 html> (accessed 13-06-2012)
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declaratory order in terms of which the applicant would be entitled to damages 
instead of removal of the encroachment and that the respondent be entitled to 
transfer of ownership of the SANParks portion.3
The court considered these defences raised by the respondent. With regard 
to the alleged sale between Van Rooyen and the respondent and the apparent 
knowledge of the sale ascribed to the applicant, the court found that there 
initially had been an agreement between Van Rooyen and the respondent 
for the sale of the SANParks portion; however, the agreement was cancelled 
and the sale never took place. As a result of inadequate proof of the sale, 
the court rejected the contention that the fence was there lawfully or that the 
SANParks portion was sold to the respondent.4 This resulted in the second 
defence also failing. The court found that the agreement to erect the fence 
on the property (between Van Rooyen and the respondent) was dependent 
on the valid agreement of sale. Therefore, because the sale was found to be 
invalid, the court stated that the condition was not fulfilled. Consequently, the 
court had to determine whether the fence that resulted in the encroachment 
should be removed or remain in place. Therefore, the court set out the law 
regulating encroaching structures in South Africa, specifically with regard 
to the discretion that courts have to leave encroaching structures intact in 
exchange for compensation.
The aim of this discussion is to highlight the law regulating encroachments 
with reference to the way in which the court in Phillips dealt with the problem. 
There are two aspects that will be highlighted and addressed here. The first 
concerns the fact that although the default remedy in the case of encroaching 
structures is removal, it was again stated in Phillips that courts have the 
discretion to award compensation instead of removal in certain instances. 
The court considered in which circumstances it will exercise such a discretion 
and stressed that it will follow a balancing-of-interests type of approach. 
Therefore, it is necessary to first discuss how courts go about exercising 
their discretion in the context of encroaching structures with reference to the 
Phillips judgment.
The second interesting aspect that arises from Phillips regarding the way 
that courts currently deal with encroachment disputes relates to the fact 
that courts in reaching a discretion-based outcome simply brush over or do 
not even consider the question of transfer of the encroached-upon land. Of 
specific importance is whether courts actually have the power to order transfer 
of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher. In Phillips, the respondent 
claimed that if the court were to leave the encroaching fence in place, it should 
additionally make an order in terms of which ownership of the SANParks 
portion is transferred to the respondent. The court actually considered but 
eventually rejected this claim, without adequately determining whether it in 
3 The respondent also claimed a final defence, namely that the court does not have jurisdiction concerning 
the dispute because the dispute falls to be determined in terms of s 29 of the second Schedule of the 
Fencing Act 31 of 1963  See Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 
27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII para 3
4 Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII 
para 7
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fact had the authority to make such an order. Without the necessary authority, 
there may be serious questions surrounding the forced sale of land that results 
in these instances.
The Phillips judgment gives us an insight as to how South African courts are 
currently dealing with encroachment disputes. However, it will also become 
evident that the discretion-based outcome may result in uncertainties due to 
the fact that policy considerations are taken into account to determine which 
outcome would be the most appropriate.
2  The discretion to replace removal with compensation: A 
policy-driven approach
In terms of the South African common law, the affected landowner can 
demand that the encroaching structure be removed in the case where a building 
is erected on the land of another. This is traditionally explained as being the 
default remedy in the case of encroachments.5 This remedy is essentially based 
on the right to prevent interference with the use and enjoyment of one’s property.6 
Milton describes this as follows:
“The right of an owner to demand removal would, in theory, seem to be absolute for he is vindicating 
the freedom of his property from unlawful interference.”7
Similarly, Van der Merwe and Cilliers explain that “[t]he right to insist on 
the removal of the encroachment is consistent with the concept of ownership, 
which is potentially the most extensive real right which a person can have in 
respect of an object, whether movable or immovable”.8
Therefore, a landowner is entitled, upon becoming aware of the 
encroachment, to demand removal thereof. However, the law regulating 
encroaching structures in South Africa has developed in a different 
direction recently. In Rand Waterraad v Bothma9 (“Rand Waterraad”) and 
Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale10 (“Brian Lackey Trust”) it was 
emphasised that courts have the discretion (in as yet undefined instances) to 
award compensation instead of removal of encroaching structures. This was 
accepted in the Phillips judgment.11 Therefore, it seems as though it is no 
longer possible to think about removal as the default remedy in the case of 
encroaching structures without adding the all-important caveat that it is likely 
5 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 202; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 121; JRL Milton “The Law of Neighbours in SA” (1969) 
Acta Juridica 123 237; CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘Year and a Day Rule’ in South African 
Law: Do our Courts Have a Discretion to Order Damages Instead of Removal in the Case of Structural 
Encroachments on Neighbouring Land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587 588  See further Pike v Hamilton 1853-
1856 2 Searle 191 196, 198, 200; Van Boom v Visser 1904 21 SC 360 361; Stark v Broomberg 1904 CTR 
135 137
6 Van der Merwe Sakereg 201; Wade v Paruk 1904 25 NLR 219 225; Smith v Basson 1979 1 SA 559 (W) 
560
7 Milton (1969) Acta Juridica 241
8 Van der Merwe & Cilliers (1994) THRHR 588
9 1997 3 SA 120 (O)  Rand Waterraad v Bothma 1997 3 SA 120 (O) provides a good illustration of how the 
rigid enforcement of the primary remedy of removal was refused because of the possibility that it could 
produce unjust results
10 2004 3 SA 281 (C)  
11 (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII para 21  
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that courts may not order the removal of an encroachment in certain instances 
due to the discretion that the court has in this regard.
However, having established this, it now becomes important to consider 
how courts will go about exercising this discretion. In other words, it needs 
to be established in which circumstances courts are likely to deviate from the 
remedy of removal and award compensation instead. The decision in Phillips 
illustrates this nicely. Relying on Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust, the 
court first confirms that it indeed has the discretion to award compensation 
instead of removal in the case of encroaching structures and then proceeds 
to determine how the discretion should be exercised in the particular case.12 
From Phillips it can be deduced that a court will follow an essentially policy-
driven approach when exercising its discretion in encroachment disputes. A 
court will balance the interests of both parties to determine whether removal 
or compensation would be the most appropriate remedy. In doing so, it will 
take cognisance of the right of removal, but keep in mind that this right is by no 
means conclusive anymore.13 Courts may refuse to grant an order for removal 
if policy reasons dictate that the most appropriate remedy is compensation 
instead of removal. The crucial question then is in what circumstances policy 
reasons will most likely dictate that the encroachment should be left in place. 
Stated differently, when can it be expected that removal will be refused and 
compensation awarded instead?
In Rand Waterraad, the main policy reason relied upon by the court as 
justification for leaving the encroachments in place was acquiescence or delay 
in bringing the application.14 The court found that the time period between 
becoming aware of the encroachment and filing the complaint for its removal 
indicated that the detriment suffered by the affected landowner on account 
of the encroachment was insignificant. The court reasoned that the applicant 
would have approached the matter with greater urgency had the encroachment 
caused as great a disadvantage as alleged by the applicant.15 The court also 
stated that justice and equity dictated that the tardiness with which the applicant 
had approached the removal process should result in the order for removal 
being denied. Therefore, the court concluded that the loss that the applicant 
would suffer if the encroachment were left intact was less than the loss that 
the defendant would suffer if the encroachment were removed.16 Based on all 
these considerations, the court ordered that the encroachment should remain 
in place.
The application of the notions of fairness and the balancing of the interests 
as formulated in Rand Waterraad was illustrated more pertinently in the 
subsequent case of Brian Lackey Trust.17 In this case the court reasoned that 
two considerations played an important role in determining the most just and 
equitable outcome in a given case; namely, the possible prejudice to be suffered 
12 Para 21
13 Para 24
14 Rand Waterraad v Bothma 1997 3 SA 120 (O) 138  
15 138-139
16 139
17 Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 3 SA 281 (C)
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by the respective parties and the principles of neighbour law.18 The court 
acknowledged that the court order could lead to the loss of the defendant’s 
property, but stated that the loss that would be suffered if demolition were 
granted would be far greater for the plaintiff than the loss for the defendant 
should damages be awarded. Furthermore, it stated that, unlike the plaintiff, 
the defendant would be fully compensated if the encroachment were left in 
place. If the encroachment were demolished the plaintiff would lose his home 
without being compensated for his loss. Furthermore, the court assessed the 
degree of prejudice by considering the fact that courts are generally reluctant 
to order removal of economically valuable building works.19 With regard to the 
principles of neighbour law, the court indicated that it was not willing to make 
an order that would potentially cause further disharmony in the relationship 
between the neighbours.20 Moreover, due to the fact that the defendant was 
initially willing to accept monetary compensation, the court reasoned that 
a demolition order would increase his superior bargaining power, which 
could allow him to extort large sums of money from the plaintiff. The court 
in Brian Lackey Trust therefore concluded that the remedy of compensation 
would fully meet the equitable notion of justice in this case and that the 
encroachment should remain in place.21 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
balanced the interests of both parties, took various policy considerations into 
account and decided that justice demanded that the encroachment should not 
be removed. The court in the Phillips case relied on the manner in which 
Brian Lackey Trust balanced the prejudice of the respective parties based on 
policy considerations in order to determine which outcome would be the most 
appropriate in the particular case.22
In Phillips, the potential prejudice suffered by the respective parties was 
balanced by looking at the loss that would be suffered by the encroacher if the 
fence were removed and the loss for the affected landowner if the fence was left 
intact. The applicant argued that if he were deprived of the SANParks portion 
the potential prejudice suffered by him would be substantial: he would be 
precluded from conducting his intended eco-enterprise and the property would 
be deprived of the spectacular viewing decks and tented accommodation on, 
18 Para 34
19 Para 38  The argument raised is that courts have a natural aversion to deny demolishing economically 
valuable building works  See Van Rensburg v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2007 4 All SA 
950 (SE), where the court found that it did have the discretion to award compensation instead of removal 
but, based on the conduct of the respondent, amongst other things, demolition would be the appropriate 
remedy  There have also been other recent decisions in which the impression has been created that courts 
are not shy to order the demolition of unlawfully erected, but nevertheless so-called “economically 
valuable buildings”  See further Barnett v Minister of Land Affairs 2007 6 SA 313 (SCA); Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape 2007 4 SA 26 (C); PS Booksellers (Pty) v Harrison 2008 
3 SA 633 (C); Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties (405/08) ZAECHC 42 (20 March 2008) SAFLII 
<http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZAECHC/2008/42 html> (accessed 05-07-2012)  See also AJ van der 
Walt “Regulation of Building Under the Constitution” (2009) 42 De Jure 32 34-42
20 Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 3 SA 281 (C) para 40
21 Para 44  See also Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 
2010) SAFLII para 21
22 Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII 
para 21
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and walking trails through the forested areas.23 The applicant also emphasised 
the fact that he had purchased the property subject to the condition that the 
SANParks portion was included as part of the property he bought.24 On the 
other hand, the respondent contended that it would be impractical to remove 
the predator-proof fence and relocate it at the cadastral boundary. He pointed 
out that it would be impossible (or at least very costly) to effectively maintain 
a fence that was relocated to the cadastral boundary and erecting a fence of that 
nature on the boundary would result in the destruction of large tracts of forest 
which would have adverse consequences for the conservation of biodiversity.25 
Moreover, the respondent argued that if it were to carry out its functions in 
terms of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 
2003 it was essential that the fence remained at its current location.26 However, 
the main argument relied upon by the respondent was the fact that removing 
and relocating the fence would be impractical and inexpedient in this case. 
The court relied on the language in Brian Lackey Trust to balance the potential 
prejudice to the respective parties and concluded that removal of the fence 
and its relocation on the cadastral boundary would not result in a striking 
disproportionality of prejudice that may potentially be suffered by the respective 
parties.27 Therefore, it seems as though courts may be persuaded to exercise 
their discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment in place if policy reasons 
convince the court that there may be a disproportionate prejudice suffered by 
the affected landowner if the encroachment were removed. This decision is 
of course context-sensitive, based on the policy considerations prevailing in 
the specific case, and cannot be prejudged unless circumstances are relatively 
similar.
Having decided against exercising its discretion in favour of leaving the 
encroachment in place, the court in Phillips avoided having to answer the 
very important question of what would happen in terms of the rights of the 
respective parties to the encroached-upon land if the court were to exercise 
its discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment in place. This could very 
well have happened if policy reasons in Phillips favoured the encroacher, as 
it did in the earlier Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust judgments. The 
judgment proves that the court considered this possibility seriously.
In the case of encroaching structures, it is clear that the purpose of the 
remedy of removal is to restore the situation to the status quo ante. In other 
words, removal is ordered in order to eliminate the unlawful encroachment. 
By contrast, if the court decides that the encroachment should be left in 
place, the court, based on policy reasons, legitimates the continuance of the 
encroachment. The encroacher is allowed to continue occupying the part of 
the neighbour’s property affected by the encroachment. This situation raises 
a number of questions, such as whether there should be a rearrangement or 
23 Para 30
24 Para 29
25 Para 36  There appears to be a mistake in the SAFLII text of the judgment  The word “tracks” appears in 
the judgment; however, the word should be “tracts”  
26 Paras 18, 39
27 Para 51
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reallocation of rights with regard to the encroached-upon land. In the Phillips 
case, the question would have been who would own the SANParks portion if 
removal were denied and replaced with a compensation award? To my mind, 
this question needs to be addressed adequately in cases where policy reasons 
dictate that compensation instead of removal is a serious option.28
It should be kept in mind that if the encroachment is allowed to continue 
and the court additionally orders that the encroached-upon land should be 
transferred to the encroacher, the affected landowner would be forced to give 
up his property against his will. The court in Phillips seriously considered 
whether, in addition to leaving the encroachment in place, it should order that 
the SANParks portion be transferred to the respondent.29 However, in my 
view, the decision to order transfer of the encroached-upon land should be kept 
separate from the discretion to replace injunctive relief with compensation. 
This issue is addressed in the following section.
3  Transfer of the encroached-upon land
The contentions of the respondent in the Phillips case demonstrates the 
confusion surrounding the question whether a court has the power to order 
that the encroached-upon land should be transferred to the encroacher.30 In 
this case, the respondent argued that if the court exercised its discretion in 
favour of leaving the encroachment in place, it should also make an order in 
terms of which the respondent would be entitled to transfer of the encroached-
upon land.31 The court considered the claim for transfer without probing the 
question of whether the court is authorised to make such an order. It simply 
assumed that the discretion in the context of encroachments to deny removal 
of the encroachment includes the power to order transfer of the encroached-
upon land.32 However, it seems as if this assumption is misplaced.
If the court in this case decided to order transfer of the encroached-upon 
land to the respondent, it would have been against the affected landowner’s 
will. Therefore, the court would have enforced a compulsory transfer of the 
affected land to the encroacher. Such an involuntary transfer needs to comply 
with section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the 
Constitution”). The court in Phillips did recognise that the loss of property 
that would occur if such an order was made would result in a deprivation of 
property. It stated:
28 The court in Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 
April 2010) SAFLII does not mention what would happen in terms of the rights of the parties to the 
encroached-upon land if the court were to exercise its discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment 
in place  Fortunately, it was unnecessary in this case because the court in fact did order removal of the 
encroachment  In this discussion, I deliberately refrain from going into too much detail with regard to 
the rights of the respective parties if removal is denied, because it was not an issue in this case  For 
an explanation of the potential doctrinal implications and the arguments raised to possibly address the 
doctrinal equivocation, see Z Temmers Building Encroachments and Compulsory Transfer of Ownership 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2010) ch 4
29 Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII 
para 9
30 Para 3
31 Para 3
32 Para 51
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“It is indisputable that an encroachment of the nature in issue in the instant case constitutes an 
interference with the applicant’s property rights such as to constitute a deprivation in terms of the 
provisions of section 25 of the Constitution.”33
The deprivation in this case would have consisted in the loss of ownership 
of the portion of the property affected by the encroachment, in other words, 
loss of the SANParks portion.34 The question is whether this deprivation 
would have been consistent with section 25 of the Constitution.
In terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, there are two requirements 
that need to be met. In the first instance, the deprivation must be in terms 
of law of general application and secondly, the law may not allow for an 
arbitrary deprivation of property.35 The law of general application regulating 
encroachments is the common law.36 The common law allows in certain 
instances that a court may deviate from the default remedy of removal and 
award compensation instead. The deprivation caused by merely awarding 
compensation instead of removal may therefore in principle be authorised by 
the common law. However, it is not so clear that the common law authorises 
the further deprivation caused by the order for transfer of the encroached-
upon property. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether a court has the 
common-law power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land against the 
affected landowner’s will.
On a closer examination of early South African case law, my argument is 
that the discretion to replace injunctive relief with compensation should be 
kept separate from the power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land. 
Early South African case law did not always keep these two issues separate 
and this led to confusion as to the extent of the discretion.37 There are four 
decisions that may be helpful when scrutinising the scope of the courts’ 
discretion in the case of encroachments. The decision that is typically used 
to support the argument that a court has the discretion to order transfer of the 
encroached-upon land to the encroacher is Christie v Haarhoff.38 In this case 
the plaintiff applied for the removal of a substantial encroachment erected 
33 Para 24
34 In the case where transfer of the affected land is ordered, it is clear that the affected landowner loses 
ownership of the portion of the property affected by the encroachment  Therefore, it needs to be 
determined whether the loss of ownership that results in these instances complies with s 25(1) of the 
Constitution  However, a deprivation can also result in the instances where the court merely replaces 
injunctive relief with compensation  I have argued before that in these instances a distinction needs to 
be drawn between significant and insignificant encroachments, because the extent of the interference 
with the affected landowner’s property differs  In the case of significant encroachments, the continued 
presence of the encroachment results in a significant limitation on the affected landowner’s right  
Therefore, stronger justification is required for the loss of property rights that occurs in these instances  
When dealing with insignificant encroachments, there is still a limitation on the affected landowner’s 
property, but the limitation is trivial because the affected landowner only loses the use and enjoyment of 
a small portion of his property  See Temmers Building Encroachments ch 5
35 S 25(1) of the Constitution
36 Both Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 44 and S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) paras 64-65 
provide authority for the fact that the common law is law of general application  In Phillips v South 
African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII it was reiterated 
that “law of general application includes the common law” (para 23)
37 Christie v Haarhoff 1886-1887 4 HCG 349; Van Boom v Visser 1904 21 SC 360; De Villiers v Kalson 1928 
EDL 217  See also AJ van der Walt “Replacing Property Rules with Liability Rules: Encroachment by 
Building” (2008) 125 SALJ 592 605
38 1886-1887 4 HCG 349
260 STELL LR 2012 2
       
on his property. The plaintiff alternatively claimed compensation instead of 
removal. Therefore, it seems as though the plaintiff was willing to accept 
compensation instead of removal and the inevitable loss of property that 
would accompany the continued existence of the encroachment. The court 
described the situation as follows:
“In this case, however, the plaintiff very properly does not press his strict rights [to removal of 
the encroachment] to the extreme point; and it is practically agreed that the proper course will be 
for the plaintiff to transfer to the defendants the ground built upon, upon their paying all expenses 
of and incidental to the transfer, together with reasonable compensation for depriving him of the 
ground.”39
Consequently, there is reason to believe that the court in this case merely 
facilitated a bilateral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants and 
that the transfer was not ordered against the affected landowner’s will. Both 
parties were amenable to the transfer. Similarly, in Van Boom v Visser40 the 
plaintiff did not press his rights either, but was willing to accept 100 pounds to 
tolerate the encroachment. The court gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff, 
reiterating that removal was the default remedy in the case of encroachments. 
However, the court stated that as an alternative the defendant could pay 25 
pounds for the transfer of the piece of property on which the encroachment 
stood. Although the end result in this case was that transfer was ordered, a 
very important qualification should be added. The transfer of the encroached-
upon land was dependent on the willingness of the affected landowner to give 
up his property and it was not a unilateral involuntary transfer of the affected 
land.
In another case where the issue of transfer of the encroached-upon land 
arose, Meyer v Keiser,41 the defendant argued that the court has a discretion 
to order that the encroached-upon land be transferred to him. Therefore, 
the defendant directly claimed that the court should enforce the sale of the 
encroached-upon land. The court rejected the defendant’s claim and stated 
that his argument was based on a misconception of the nature and extent of 
the court’s discretionary authority.42 The court emphasised that an order for 
transfer of the encroached-upon land is merely incidental to the damages 
award, which is the primary remedy in terms of a court’s discretionary power. 
The court relied on the earlier case of De Villiers v Kalson43 to emphasise 
that the order for transfer of the encroached-upon land does not always have 
to accompany a compensation order.44 In De Villiers v Kalson, the court 
had to determine whether an encroaching structure should be removed or 
remain in place. The court exercised its discretion in favour of leaving the 
encroachment in place and said nothing about transfer of the encroached-
upon land to the encroacher. Therefore, this case illustrates that an order 
for transfer does not necessarily have to follow if removal is not ordered. 
39 354 (emphasis added)
40 1904 21 SC 360
41 1980 3 SA 504 (D)
42 507
43 De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217
44 Meyer v Keiser 1980 3 SA 504 (D) 507
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Such an order is ancillary and it should not be given if it is impractical 
or impermissible by law to do so.45 My guess is that the practicality and 
permissibility of giving a transfer order will in most cases depend on the 
willingness of the affected landowner to surrender the property. Therefore, 
it would probably be unacceptable in cases where the transfer is ordered 
against the will of the affected landowner.
The power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land in the context of 
building encroachments is therefore a separate power that should be entirely 
dependent on the willingness of the affected landowner to give up his property. 
The judgments that seemingly endorse the idea that such a power exists as a 
self-evident result of a decision not to order removal of the encroachment in 
fact do not provide authority for the view that a court may order transfer of 
the affected land against the will of the landowner. At best, the cases indicate 
that where there was consent or at least willingness to give up the property a 
court may, in addition to replacing removal with compensation, facilitate the 
transfer of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher.
It is evident from De Villiers v Kalson and Meyer v Keiser that the order 
for transfer of the encroached-upon land does not have to be made and 
that the alternative remedy in terms of the discretion is compensation.46 
Consequently, the encroacher will always have to claim compensation instead 
of removal as the remedy and she cannot argue that the court should always 
as an incidence of the remedy of compensation order transfer of the affected 
land.47 The court may determine that transfer should be ordered in addition 
to damages, but as is evident from the older cases mentioned above, this will 
depend on the willingness of the affected landowner to sacrifice his property. 
The primary remedy in favour of which the court must exercise its discretion 
is a compensatory award instead of injunctive relief and the transfer of the 
encroached-upon land is not a necessary incidence of a compensatory award. 
As the matter stands, there is no authority in either common law or legislation 
in terms of which a court can order a forced sale of land in the context of 
encroachments. If the affected landowner does not want to give up his property, 
the involuntary transfer of property that a court order to transfer the property 
implies will be problematic in the light of section 25 of the Constitution, 
specifically with regard to the requirement of law of general application. The 
deprivation that results in these instances may prove to be unconstitutional on 
the basis that the common law does not authorise the deprivation.
An interesting question is whether the deprivation could amount to an 
expropriation that would need to comply with section 25(2) and (3) of the 
Constitution. The deprivation that results when courts leave the encroaching 
structure in place may look like an expropriation, especially in cases where 
the court decides not to order removal and orders transfer of the land. The 
alternative relief ordered by the courts in these cases, namely compensation, 
may create the illusion that this is indeed an expropriation. Therefore, it 
45 De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217; Meyer v Keiser 1980 3 SA 504 (D) 507
46 De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217; Meyer v Keiser 1980 3 SA 504 (D) 507
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needs to be determined whether an order that the encroachment should 
remain in place and that the encroached-upon land should be transferred to 
the encroacher amounts to expropriation of ownership of the land on which 
the encroachment is erected. The crucial consideration is that expropriation 
is not possible in these cases because the common law does not authorise 
expropriation and there is no legislation that authorises expropriation by court 
order either. Considering the fact that there is no common law authority for the 
expropriation, it may be concluded that the compulsory transfer of property or 
property rights that results when an encroachment is not demolished can never 
amount to an expropriation. Leaving the encroachment in place may in some 
cases effectively result in a forced transfer of a right to use and enjoyment, and 
it may purport to effect a forced transfer of ownership if transfer of the land 
is ordered, but it would never amount to a valid expropriation. Therefore, in 
encroachment cases, expropriation should not come into the picture at all.
4  Conclusion
The Phillips case that formed the centre of this discussion provides a good 
(and most recent) illustration of how we can expect South African courts 
to deal with building encroachment disputes. It is clear that removal is no 
longer the automatic remedy in the case of encroachments. Courts may in 
certain cases refuse removal and award compensation instead. The Eastern 
Cape High Court decision shows that the decision to replace removal with 
compensation is reached on the basis of a policy-driven approach dictated by 
the circumstances of the particular case.
The court seems to accept that the ideal method is to balance the interests 
of both parties in order to reach a solution that does not result in striking 
disproportionality of the potential prejudice suffered by the respective 
parties. Based on this principle, courts exercise their discretion in the context 
of encroaching structures and reach a policy decision either in favour of the 
encroacher (by denying removal) or in favour of the affected landowner (in 
which case the encroachment will be removed).
Furthermore, the Phillips case creates the impression that the discretion is 
stretched to include not only replacing of injunctive relief with compensation, 
but also to transfer of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher. The 
court considered such an order but refrained from making it on account 
of its decision on the preliminary issue, namely to order removal of the 
encroachment. However, as illustrated, there is no authority in either common 
law or legislation in terms of which the court can sanction a forced sale of land 
in the context of building encroachments. In fact, judging from precedent, 
the issue of whether the encroached-upon land should be transferred, is a 
separate issue that should be dependent entirely on the willingness of the 
affected landowner to give up his property. The early South African cases are 
ambiguous and do not provide conclusive answers to the questions concerning 
the ambit of the courts’ discretion. At best, the cases show that where there 
was consent by the affected landowner or at least the willingness to give up 
the property a court may, in addition to replacing removal with compensation, 
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facilitate the transfer of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher. If the 
affected landowner would not want to give up the encroached-upon part of 
his property and the court orders the transfer, the involuntary transfer may be 
problematic in light of section 25(1) of the Constitution because it is not duly 
authorised.
It seems inappropriate to use expropriation language in the context of 
encroachment. Where a court decides to leave an encroaching structure intact, 
it may look like an expropriation of ownership of the affected land where 
transfer of the encroached-upon land is ordered. However, an expropriation in 
the context of encroachment is not possible. The reason why the deprivation 
could not be considered an expropriation of the encroached-upon land in the case 
of encroachment is that the common law does not authorise the expropriation 
and there is no legislation to authorise such an order either. Therefore, the 
possibility that this could amount to an expropriation is excluded.
To my mind, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between the exercise of 
the discretion to replace injunctive relief with compensation and the power 
to transfer the land to the encroaching landowner. Courts fail to draw this 
distinction, resulting in obscure and confusing precedents in respect of the 
question of transfer of the encroached-upon land. Fortunately, the court in 
Phillips ordered removal of the encroaching fence, and the remarks on the 
transfer of the encroached-upon land are therefore obiter. However, the fact 
that the court considered transfer is troubling. In my view, courts should 
refrain from orders for the transfer of the encroached-upon land because they 
may be unconstitutional.
SUMMARY
The main focus of this note is Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] 
ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) SAFLII <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAECGHC/2010/27.html> 
(accessed 13-06-2012), which was a case dealing with the erection of a fence that encroached on the 
applicant’s property. The note explores the current way that courts deal with encroachment disputes 
in light of the Phillips judgment. This judgment correctly confirms that courts assume the existence 
of a wide discretion to replace injunctive relief (or mandatory interdicts) with compensatory awards; it 
illustrates how the discretion will be exercised in order to reach a just and equitable outcome and lays 
open the possible constitutional implications that may be triggered if encroachments are not ordered 
to be removed.
What is problematic in this case is that the court considered the possibility of ordering transfer of the 
land to the affected landowner. If a court exercises its discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment 
in place and additionally orders that the encroached-upon land be transferred to the encroacher, this 
court order sanctions an involuntary transfer of the affected property. The loss of property or property 
rights needs to comply with section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The 
crucial concern in this case is whether the common law actually authorises such a court order that 
results in the deprivation. However, the possible constitutional problem that may have been created 
by an order for transfer of the affected land was avoided because the court ordered in terms of its 
discretion that the encroachment be removed. It should be noted, though, that the court’s remarks 
concerning the transfer order were made purely on the basis of the balance of prejudice and not on 
any constitutional principle. To my mind, the possibility of constitutional infringement may very well 
have arisen if the balance of prejudice favoured the encroacher and therefore the issue needs to be 
considered.
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